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Making Digital Artifacts on the Web
Verifiable and Reliable
Tobias Kuhn and Michel Dumontier
Abstract—The current Web has no general mechanisms to make digital artifacts — such as datasets, code, texts, and images —
verifiable and permanent. For digital artifacts that are supposed to be immutable, there is moreover no commonly accepted method to
enforce this immutability. These shortcomings have a serious negative impact on the ability to reproduce the results of processes that
rely on Web resources, which in turn heavily impacts areas such as science where reproducibility is important. To solve this problem, we
propose trusty URIs containing cryptographic hash values. We show how trusty URIs can be used for the verification of digital artifacts,
in a manner that is independent of the serialization format in the case of structured data files such as nanopublications. We demonstrate
how the contents of these files become immutable, including dependencies to external digital artifacts and thereby extending the range
of verifiability to the entire reference tree. Our approach sticks to the core principles of the Web, namely openness and decentralized
architecture, and is fully compatible with existing standards and protocols. Evaluation of our reference implementations shows that
these design goals are indeed accomplished by our approach, and that it remains practical even for very large files.
Index Terms—Decentralized systems, data publishing, Semantic Web, Linked Data, Resource Description Framework, nanopublica-
tions
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IN many areas and in particular in science, repro-ducibility is important. Verifiable, immutable, and
permanent digital artifacts are an important ingredient
for making the results of automated processes repro-
ducible, but the current Web offers no commonly ac-
cepted methods to ensure these properties. Endeavors
such as the Semantic Web to publish complex knowl-
edge in a machine-interpretable manner aggravate this
problem, as automated algorithms operating on large
amounts of data can be expected to be even more vulner-
able than humans to manipulated or corrupted content.
Without appropriate counter-measures, malicious actors
can sabotage or trick such algorithms by adding just a
few carefully manipulated items to large sets of input
data. To solve this problem, we propose an approach to
make items on the (Semantic) Web verifiable, immutable,
and permanent. This approach includes cryptographic
hash values in Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) and
adheres to the core principles of the Web, namely open-
ness and decentralized architecture. This article is an
extended and revised version of a conference paper [1].
A cryptographic hash value (sometimes called cryp-
tographic digest) is a short random-looking sequence of
bytes (or, equivalently, bits) that are calculated in a
complicated yet perfectly predictable manner from a
digital artifact such as a file. The same input always
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leads to exactly the same hash value, whereas just a
minimally modified input returns a completely different
value. While there is an infinity of possible inputs that
lead to a specific given hash value, it is impossible in
practice (for strong state-of-the-art hash algorithms) to
reconstruct any of the possible inputs just from the hash
value. This means that if you are given some input and
a matching hash value, you can be sure that the hash
value was obtained from exactly that input. On this
basis, our proposed approach boils down to the idea that
references can be made completely unambiguous and
verifiable if they contain a hash value of the referenced
digital artifact. Our method does not apply to all URIs,
of course, but only to those that are meant to represent
a specific and immutable digital artifact.
Let us have a look at a concrete example: Nanopublica-
tions have been proposed as a new way of scientific pub-
lishing [2]. The underlying idea is that scientific results
should be published not just as narrative articles but also
in terms of minimal pieces of computer-interpretable
results in a formal semantic notation (i.e. RDF). Nano-
publications can cite other nanopublications via their
URIs, thereby creating complex citation networks. Pub-
lished nanopublications are supposed to be immutable,
but there is currently no mechanism to enforce this. It
is well-known that even artifacts that are supposed to
be immutable tend to change over time, while often
keeping the same URI reference. For approaches like
nanopublications, however, it is important to specify
exactly what version of what resource they are based on,
and nobody should be given the opportunity to silently
modify his or her already published contributions.
With the approach outlined below, nanopublications
can be identified with trusty URIs that include crypto-
graphic hash values calculated on the RDF content. For
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the range of verifiability for the trusty URI on the top left. The green area shows its
range of verifiability that covers all artifacts that can be reached by following trusty URI links (green arrows).
example, let us assume that you have a nanopublication
with identifier I1 that cites another nanopublication with
identifier I2. If you want to find the content of I2, you can
simply search for it on the Web, not worrying whether
the source is trustworthy or not, and once you have
found an artifact that claims to be I2, you only have
to check whether the hash value actually matches the
content. If it does, you got the right nanopublication,
and if not you have to keep searching (this can of course
be automated). A trusty URI like I1 does not only allow
you to retrieve its nanopublication in a verifiable way,
but in the next step also all nanopublications it cites
(such as I2) and all nanopublications they cite and so
on. Any trusty URI in a way “contains” the complete
backwards history that is reachable by following trusty
URI links. In this sense, the range of verifiability is not
just the resource itself, but the complete reference tree
obtained by recursively following all contained trusty
URIs. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Another important property of nanopublications is
that they are self-contained in the sense that they consist
not only of the actual scientific assertions but also of their
provenance information and meta-data. This means that
nanopublications contain self-references in the form of
their own identifying URIs. The calculation of a trusty
URI must therefore allow for the resulting URI to be
part of the digital artifact it is calculated on (this might
sound impossible at first, but we show below how it
can be achieved). This leads us to the formulation of the
following requirements:
1) To allow for verification of not only a given digital
artifact but its entire reference tree, the hash should
be part of the URI of the artifact.
2) To allow for the inclusion of meta-data, digital ar-
tifacts should be allowed to contain self-references
(i.e. their own URIs).
3) The verification should be performed on a more
abstract level than just the bytes of a file, with
modules for different types of content. It should
be possible to verify a digital artifact even if it is
presented in a different format.
4) The complete approach should be decentralized
and open: Everybody should be allowed to make
verifiable URIs without a central authority.
5) The approach should be based on current estab-
lished standards and be compatible with current
tools and formats, so that it can be used right away.
Though there are a number of related approaches, we
are not aware of any general approach that complies
with all these requirements. In particular, requirements
2 and 3 are not addressed by existing approaches. The
main benefits of artifacts with a trusty URI are that they
are verifiable, immutable, and permanent. Let us briefly
explain what we mean by these properties.
Trusty URI artifacts are verifiable in the sense that a
retrieved artifact for a given URI can be checked to
contain the content the URI is supposed to represent.
It can be detected if the artifact got corrupted or manip-
ulated on the way, assuming that the trusty URI for the
required artifact is known, e.g. because another artifact
contains it as a link. (Of course, somebody can give you
a manipulated artifact with a different trusty URI.)
It directly follows that trusty URI artifacts are im-
mutable, as any change in the content also changes its
URI, thereby making it a new artifact. Again, you can of
course change your artifact and its URI and claim that
it has always been like this. You can get away with that
if the trusty URI has not yet been picked up by third
parties, i.e. linked by other resources. Once this is the
case, it cannot be changed anymore, because all these
links will still point to the old trusty URI and everybody
will notice that the new artifact is a different one.
Third, trusty URI artifacts are permanent if we assume
that there are search engines and Web archives crawling
the artifacts on the Web and caching them. In this
situation, any artifact that is available on the Web for a
sufficiently long time will remain available forever. If an
artifact is no longer available in its original location (e.g.
the one its URI resolves to), one can still retrieve it from
the cache of search engines, Web archives, or dedicated
replication services. The trusty URI guarantees that it is
the artifact you are looking for, even if the location of
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the cached artifact is not trustworthy or it was cached
from an untrustworthy source.
2 BACKGROUND
There are a number of related approaches based on
cryptographic hash values. The Git version control sys-
tem (http://git-scm.com), for example, uses hash val-
ues to identify commits of distributed repositories. For
such a distributed repository, commits can happen asyn-
chronously and anywhere (even when the respective
site is offline). All sites need to be able to issue com-
mit identifiers, yet these identifiers have to be unique.
Hash values are a natural solution to this problem.
An important difference to our approach is that hash
values (called checksums in Git) are used to identify the
respective artifacts (commits in Git) only within a given
repository and not on the Web scale. A second important
difference is that the hash represents the byte content of
files, whereas our approach allows for digital content at
different levels of abstraction. On the technical side, Git
uses the SHA-1 algorithm, which is no longer considered
secure (which is not a serious problem for Git, because
typically only trusted parties have write access to a
repository).
The proposed standard for Named Information (ni)
URIs [3] is another important related approach. It intro-
duces a new URI protocol ni to refer to digital artifacts
with hash values in a uniform way. These are two
examples of ni-URIs:
ni:///sha-256;UyaQV-Ev4rdLoHyJJWCi11OHfrYv9E1a
GQAlMO2X_-Q
ni://example.org/sha-256;5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9
ruBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO70
The ni-URI approach allows for different hash algo-
rithms, such as SHA-256 (which is, in contrast to SHA-1,
considered secure) and optional specification of an au-
thority, such as example.org, where the artifact can be
found. It misses, however, some of the features of our list
of requirements. As with Git, ni-URIs do not define how
digital artifacts can be represented at a more abstract
level than their sequence of bytes, and self-references
are not supported. Furthermore, current browsers do not
recognize the ni protocol, and administrator access to
a server is needed to make these URIs resolvable. The
latter two points are not a real problem in the long run,
but they might hinder the adoption of the standard in
the first place. The approach presented in this paper
is complementary and compatible. We propose trusty
URIs, which can be mapped to ni-URIs but are more
flexible and provide additional features.
There are a number of existing approaches to include
hash values in URIs for verifiability purposes, e.g. for
legal documents [4]. The downside of such custom-made
solutions is that custom-made software is required to
generate, resolve, and check the hash references. Here,
we propose a general approach that could replace such
specific ones, thereby establishing interoperability of sys-
tems and standard infrastructure for creating, resolving,
and checking hash references. Standards have been pro-
posed for the verification of quantitative datasets [5] and
XML documents [6], but they are not general enough
to cover content such as RDF graphs (at least not in a
convenient way) and they keep the hash value separate
from the URI reference, which means that the range
of verifiability does not directly extend to referenced
artifacts.
To calculate hash values on content that is more
abstract than just a fixed sequence of bytes, common
approaches require the normalization (also called canon-
icalization) of the respective data structures such as RDF
graphs. In the general case, RDF graph normalization is
known to be a very hard problem, possibly unsolvable
in polynomial time [7]. General algorithms exist [8]
but they are very inefficient in the general case, with
a runtime complexity of O(nn). This stems from the
difficulty of handling blank nodes, i.e. identifiers that
are only unique in a local scope and can be locally
renamed without effects on semantics. Without blank
nodes, normalization boils down to sorting of RDF
triples, which can be performed in O(n log n). The need
for sorting can even be eliminated by using incremental
cryptography [9], which allows for calculating digests
for RDF graphs without blank nodes in linear time [10].
Such incremental approaches, however, are not as well-
studied as mainstream cryptography methods, and open
the possibility of new kinds of attacks [11]. Efficient
normalization algorithms that support blank nodes put
restrictions on the graph structure and require additional
(semantically neutral) triples to be added to some graphs
before they can be processed [7], [10].
The general need for persistent identifiers for scien-
tific artifacts is widely acknowledged and tackled by a
number of approaches [12]. Similar methods to the ones
presented in this paper, i.e. calculating hash values in
a format-independent manner, have been proposed to
track the provenance of data sets [13]. This has been used
to define a conceptualization of multi-level identities for
digital works based on cryptographic digests and formal
semantics, covering different conceptual levels from sin-
gle HTTP transactions to high-level content identifiers
[14].
With respect to the general goal of making scientific
results more reproducible, there are notable efforts in di-
verse areas such as bioinformatics [15], computer science
[16], and psychology [17]. Research Objects (http://www.
researchobject.org) [18] are a proposal to bundle papers
with their datasets, code, workflows, logs, and other rel-
evant metadata. Such Research Objects are self-contained
and immutable packages that are sharable and cite-able,
and should make the respective research reusable and
reproducible. For this and similar approaches, trusty
URIs could be used in the future to make such bundles
and other kinds of digital artifacts verifiable and to
enforce their immutability.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING 4
3 APPROACH
We propose here a modular approach, where different
modules handle different kinds of content on different
conceptual levels of abstraction, from byte level to high-
level formalisms. Besides that, the most interesting fea-
tures of our approach are self-references, the handling of
blank nodes, and the mapping to ni-URIs.
General Structure
Trusty URIs end with a hash value in Base64 notation (a
specific alphanumeric encoding scheme) preceded by a
module identifier. This is an example:
http://example.org/r1.RA5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9r
uBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO70
Everything that comes after r1. is the part that is
specific to trusty URIs, which we call artifact code. Its
first two characters RA identify the module specifying its
type (first character) and version (second character). The
remaining 43 characters represent the actual hash value.
The precise specification of trusty URIs is given below
in Section 4. Importantly, our approach entails a certain
shift of authority: Once a trusty URI is established, its
artifact code defines what object it refers to, and the
issuing authority has no longer the power to change its
meaning.
Self-References
To support self-references, i.e. resources that contain
their own trusty URI, the generation process involves
not just to compute the hash from a given artifact but
to actually transform the artifact into a new version that
contains the newly generated trusty URI. For example,
a resource like http://example.org/r2 might have the
following RDF content with a self-reference:
<http://example.org/r2> dct:description
"something" .
To transform such a resource, we first define the struc-
ture of the new trusty URI by adding a placeholder C
where the artifact code should eventually appear. In the
given example, the content would then look like this:
<http://example.org/r2. C > dct:description
"something" .
Note that it is necessary to add a non-Base64 character
(in this case a dot “.”) as a delimiter in front of C if
it would otherwise be preceded by a Base64 character.
On such content, we can calculate a hash value by
interpreting the placeholder C as a blank space (the
result is unambiguous as URIs are not allowed to oth-
erwise contain blank spaces). Then we can replace the
placeholder by the calculated artifact code and we end
up with a trusty URI like this:
http://example.org/r2.RATf-GlZsJa1v_EG0-yl5jwc
GNPF5zRbhDifBLeG4Q57c
For strong hashing algorithms, it is impossible in practice
that this calculated sequence of bytes was already part
of the original content before the transformation. This
entails that the replacing of the placeholder is reversible.
This reversibility is needed once an existing trusty URI
resource containing self-references should be verified.
We can revert the transformation described above by
replacing all occurrences of the artifact code with a
blank space, and then calculate the hash in the same
way as when a resource is transformed. The content is
successfully verified if and only if the resulting hash
matches the one from the trusty URI.
Blank Nodes
The support for self-references requires us to transform
the preliminary content of a trusty URI artifact into its
final version, and we can make use of this transformation
to also solve the problem of blank nodes in RDF. A
blank node is basically an identifier that is only used in
a local scope and for which we do not care to specify
a concrete URI. Our approach is to eliminate blank
nodes during the transformation process by converting
them into URIs. Blank nodes can be seen as existentially
quantified variables, which we can turn into constants
by Skolemization, i.e. by introducing URIs that have not
been used anywhere before. Using the trusty URI with a
suffix enumerating the blank nodes, we can create such
URIs guaranteed to have never been used before (the
artifact code being just a placeholder at first, as above):
http://example.org/r3.RACjKTA5dl23ed7JIpgPmS0E
0dcU-XmWIBnGn6Iyk8B-U#_1
http://example.org/r3.RACjKTA5dl23ed7JIpgPmS0E
0dcU-XmWIBnGn6Iyk8B-U#_2
This approach solves the problem of blank nodes for
normalization, is completely general (i.e. works on any
possible input graph), fully respects RDF semantics, and
does not require auxiliary triples to be added.
ni-URIs
Our approach is compatible with ni-URIs (see above),
and all trusty URIs can be transformed into ni-URIs, with
or without explicitly specifying an authority:
ni:///sha-256;5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9ruBosiL5XDU
3rxBbBaUO70
ni://example.org/sha-256;5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9
ruBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO70
The fact that the module identifier is lost does not affect
the uniqueness of the hash, but to verify a resource all
available modules have to be tried in the worst case.
To avoid this, we propose to use an optional argument
called module:
ni:///sha-256;5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9ruBosiL5XDU
3rxBbBaUO70?module=RA
Modules
There are currently two module types available: F
for representing byte-level file content and R for RDF
graphs. For type F, the only version available as of now
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is A. For type R, there are two version A and B. This
leads to the module identifiers FA, RA, and RB.
The difference between the two versions of module
type R is that RA supports multiple graphs whereas RB
requires a single RDF graph. While the former is more
general, the latter provides more information about what
the URI stands for. If a trusty URI of type RB is found
in the graph position within a file or a triple store, it is
immediately clear what it is supposed to stand for: the
triples of the respective graph. For RA one only knows
that it stands for the triples of a set of RDF graphs but
additional information is needed (e.g. provided by the
nanopublication definition) to find out which graphs.
A certain module can be defined in a way that makes
artifacts and their URIs transferable to another module,
in the sense that the module identifier can generally
be switched to the second module without changing
the hash or breaking the verification of the artifact. For
example, module RB is transferable to module RA, but
not vice versa.
Note that for an RDF document, either of the module
types F and R could be used. The right choice depends
on what the URI should identify. If it should identify a
file in a particular format and containing a fixed number
of bytes, then F should be used. If it should, however,
identify RDF content independently of its serialization
in a particular file, then R should be used. For modules
such as RA and RB that operate not just on the byte level,
content negotiation can be used to return the same content
in different formats (depending on the requested content
type in the HTTP request) when a trusty URI is accessed.
Even though we focus on RDF in this paper, the
approach and architecture of trusty URIs are general
and we plan to provide modules for additional kinds
of content in the future. This could include tabular or
matrix content (e.g. CSV or Excel files), content with
tree structure (e.g. XML), hypertext (e.g. HTML or Mark-
down), bitmaps (e.g. PNG or JPEG), and vector graphics
(e.g. SVG). New modules might also become necessary
if the used hash algorithms should become vulnerable
to attacks in the future.
4 SPECIFICATION
This section contains version 1 of the specification of the
trusty URI approach.1 The previous version was version
0, which was preliminary and not stable.2
Version 1 described here is not backward compatible
with version 0 for module RA (the handling of plain lit-
erals according to RDF 1.1 breaks compatibility). Future
versions, however, are supposed to be 100% backward
compatible with this version. This means that when the
extension of modules cannot be done in a backward
compatible manner in the future, new modules will have
to be defined and old ones will have to be deprecated.
1. http://trustyuri.net/spec/v1.FADQoZWcYugekAb4jW-
Zm3 5Cd9tmkkYEV0bxK2fLSKao.md
2. http://trustyuri.net/spec/v0.FA4BwXfTl2X-
ABWKUF2k0T044yS2-KmO R0zBftSsc96k.md
Fig. 2 shows a schematic representation of the general
structure of trusty URIs.
4.1 Basics
Hash values of trusty URIs are encoded in Base64 no-
tation with some common modifications for making it
safe to use them in URIs and file names:
Definition 1. Every character that is a standard
ASCII letter (A-Z or a-z), a digit (0-9), a
hyphen (-), or an underscore (_) is called a
Base64 character, representing in this order the
numbers from 0 to 63. There are no other Base64
characters.
Trusty URIs have the following structure:
Definition 2. Every trusty URI ends with at
least 25 Base64 characters. The sequence of
characters following the last non-Base64 charac-
ter is called the artifact code. The first two char-
acters of the artifact code are called the module
identifier. The sequence of characters following
the module identifier is called data part, which
is identical to or contains a hash part.
The current modules only generate URIs with exactly 45
trailing Base64 characters, but the definition is kept open
for future modules.
The first character of the module identifier specifies
the type of the content and therefore the type of the
module; the second character is a version identifier of
the module. The main content of the data part is the hash
value, but it can also contain other information such as
parameters and sub-types. Its concrete structure depends
on the module.
As everybody who has access to the respective domain
is free to define and use URIs at will, we can only be sure
that a certain URI is a trusty URI once we have found
and verified a content that matches the hash. For that
reason, the concept of a potential trusty URI needs to be
introduced:
Definition 3. Every URI that could be a trusty
URI according to the restrictions of Definition
2 with a module identifier matching a defined
module and with a data part that is consistent
with the structural restrictions of the given
module (in particular with respect to its length)
is called a potential trusty URI.
With these ingredients, trusty URIs can be verified:
Definition 4. Given a potential trusty URI and a
digital artifact, if the identifier part refers to an
module that returns a hash value for the digital
artifact that is identical to the one encoded in
the hash part, then the potential trusty URI is a
verified trusty URI and the digital artifact is its
verified content.
For convenience reasons, we can append a file exten-
sion like .txt or .nq to trusty URIs. The resulting URIs
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.trighttp://example.org/r1. RA 5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9ruBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO70
URI prefix
(last character
is not Base64)
artifact code
(≥ 25 Base64 characters; exactly 45 characters for currently existing modules)
module identifier
(2 characters:
type and version)
hash part
data part
sub-types / parameters
(optional; not used by currently
existing modules)
extension
(optional; first
character is a dot)
trusty URI
Example:
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the general structure of trusty URIs.
are technically no trusty URIs anymore, but it is easy to
strip the extension and get the respective trusty URIs.
As the hash values are located in the final part of the
URIs, it is straightforward to also use them in file names
and to deal with them in a local file system without
worrying about the first part of the URI. For example,
the name of such a file could therefore be:
r1.RA5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9ruBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO
70.nq
Such files are called trusty files.
4.2 Modules
There are currently three modules available: FA, RA, and
RB.
Module FA
Version A of module type F, i.e. module FA, works on
the byte content of files. A hash value is calculated
using SHA-256 [19] on the content of the file in byte
representation. The file name and other metadata are not
considered. Two zero-bits are appended to the resulting
hash value, and then transformed to Base64 notation as
defined above. The resulting 43 characters make up the
data part of the trusty URI.
Empty files, for example, get the following URI suffix:
FA47DEQpj8HBSa-_TImW-5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU
When adding such a suffix to a URI, it has to be made
sure that it is preceded by a non-Base64 character, such
as a dot (.), a slash (/), or a hash sign (#). This applies
to all modules.
Module RA
Version A of module type R, i.e. module RA, works on
RDF content, possibly covering multiple named graphs,
relying on RDF version 1.1 [20].
This module allows for self-references, i.e. the trusty
URI itself may appear in the RDF data it represents. URIs
consisting of the given trusty URI and a suffix are also
supported, such as:
http://example.org/r2.RA5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9r
uBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO70#Part1
http://example.org/r2.RA5AbXdpz5DcaYXCh9l3eI9r
uBosiL5XDU3rxBbBaUO70#Part2
Blank nodes are not supported and have to be skolem-
ized in the same way when a trusty URI is produced. It
is furthermore assumed that the data is a set of named
RDF graphs. RDF triples without a named graph are con-
sidered to belong to a special named graph represented
with the empty string.
To check whether a given artifact code correctly rep-
resents a given set of named graphs, the triples and
graphs have to be sorted first. Because the trusty URI can
appear in the RDF data it represents, all occurrences of
the given artifact code in the URIs have to be replaced by
a blank character in a preprocessing step. To determine
the order of any two triples, the first applicable rule of
the following list is applied:
1) If their graph URIs differ, the triple with the lex-
icographically smaller preprocessed graph URI is
first.
2) If their subject URIs differ, the triple with the
lexicographically smaller preprocessed subject URI
is first.
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3) If their predicate URIs differ, the triple with the lex-
icographically smaller preprocessed predicate URI
is first.
4) If one has a literal as object and the other has a
non-literal, the triple with the non-literal as object
is first.
5) If both have a URI as object, the triple with the
lexicographically smaller preprocessed object URI
is first.
6) If the literal labels of the objects differ, the triple
with the lexicographically smaller literal label is
first.
7) If one of the object literals has a datatype identi-
fier and the other does not, the triple without a
datatype identifier is first.
8) If one of the object literals has a language iden-
tifier and the other does not, the triple without a
language identifier is first.
9) The triple with the lexicographically smaller
datatype or language identifier is first.
The lexicographic order is defined on strings of Unicode
characters. If two strings have different characters at at
least one position, the string with the smaller integer
value at the first differing position is first. Otherwise,
the shorter string is first.
After the triples have been sorted, a sequence of
Unicode characters s is built. For each triple, the
serialization of its graph, its subject, its predicate,
and its object are added to the end of s, in this
order and with a newline character at the end of
each of the four. The serialization of graph, subject,
and predicate identifiers is simply their preprocessed
URI string. Objects that consist of a URI are treated
the same way. Literals without a language tag are
serialized as a circumflex character (ˆ) followed by
the datatype URI (which, according to RDF 1.1, equals
http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string if
not explicitly specified), a blank space, and the escaped
literal string. Literal strings are escaped by replacing
\ by \\ and newline characters by \n. Literals with a
language tag are serialized as an at-sign @ followed by
the canonicalized language string, a blank space, and
the escaped literal string.
The actual computation of the hash data is identical to
Module F: a SHA-256 hash is generated for s in UTF-8
encoding, two zero-bits are appended, and the result is
transformed to Base64 notation.
Module RB
Version B of module type R, i.e. module RB, is a slight
variation of module RA. While module RA can represent
any number of RDF graphs, a trusty URI using module
RB always represents just one graph. The calculation of
the hash is identical to the procedure described above,
with the only restriction being that all triples have the
trusty URI of the given resource as their graph URI.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
There are currently three trusty URI implementations in
the form of code libraries in Java, Perl, and Python.3
The Java implementation uses the Sesame library [21] for
RDF processing, the Perl implementation makes use of
the Trine package, and the Python implementation uses
RDFLib.4
These implementations provide a number of common
functions for the different modules and formats. Cur-
rently, the following functions are available:
• CheckFile takes a file and validates its hash by
applying the respective module.
• ProcessFile takes a file, calculates its hash using
module FA, and renames it to make it a trusty file.
• TransformRdf takes an RDF file and a base URI, and
transforms the file into a trusty file using a module
of type R.
• TransformLargeRdf is the same as above but using
temporary files instead of loading the entire content
into memory.
• CheckLargeRdf checks an RDF file using module
RA without loading the whole content into memory
but using temporary files instead.
• CheckSortedRdf checks an RDF file assuming that
it is already sorted (and raises an error otherwise).
The current implementations generate such sorted
files by default, but this is not required by the
specification.
• RunBatch reads commands (any of the above) from
a file and executes them one after the other.
These libraries for the different programming languages
are still work in progress: All these functions are cur-
rently supported by the Java implementation, but the
other libraries still lack some of them. Nanopublication-
specific functions now are provided by the official Java li-
brary for nanopublications5 using the trusty URI library.
The trusty URI features provided by the presented li-
braries are also made available via a validation interface
for nanopublications.6 This interface, which is shown
in Fig. 3, offers in fact much more than just valida-
tion (including transformation into different formats and
publication to nanopublication servers). Users can load
nanopublications in different ways, including retrieval
from URLs or SPARQL endpoints, and then trusty URIs
can be generated for them directly via the Web interface.
Nanopublications that already have a trusty URI are
automatically verified and users are informed about
whether the verification was successful or not.
3. https://github.com/trustyuri/trustyuri-java,
https://github.com/trustyuri/trustyuri-perl,
https://github.com/trustyuri/trustyuri-python
4. http://search.cpan.org/dist/RDF-Trine/,
https://github.com/RDFLib/rdflib
5. https://github.com/Nanopublication/nanopub-java
6. http://nanopub.inn.ac/
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Fig. 3. The nanopublication validator interface integrates features of trusty URIs. Nanopublications can be loaded
from different sources, users can generate trusty URIs for them (top), and nanopublications with trusty URIs are
automatically verified (bottom).
6 EVALUATION
Below we present some experiments on the trusty URI
concept and its implementations, based on two collec-
tions of RDF files.
6.1 Hash Generation and Checking on Nanopublica-
tions
To test our approach and to evaluate its implementa-
tions, we first took a collection of 156,026 nanopublica-
tions in TriG format that we had produced in previous
work [22]. We transformed these nanopublications into
the formats N-Quads and TriX using existing off-the-
shelf converters. Then, we transformed these into trusty
URI nanopublications using the Java implementation. To
be able to check not only positive cases (where checking
succeeds) but also negative ones (where checking fails),
we made copies of the resulting files where we changed
a random single byte in each of them (only considering
letters and numbers, and never replacing an upper-case
letter by its lower-case version or vice versa, as some
keywords are not case-sensitive). The resulting six sets
of 156,026 files each (three formats, each in two versions:
valid and corrupted) were the basis for our evaluation.
The first important result is that all original nano-
publications ended up with the same trusty URI, no
matter which format was used. This shows that our
implementations are successful in handling the content
on a more abstract level (i.e. RDF graphs in this case)
leading to identical hash values for files that contain the
same content but are quite different on the byte level.
Next, we checked the trusty URI of each nanopublica-
tion file with the function CheckFile of all implementa-
tions that support the respective format. The three right-
most columns of Table 1 show the results. For all valid
files (i.e. those we did not corrupt), all implementations
correctly verified their trusty URIs. For the corrupted
ones, where we randomly changed one byte, the checks
almost always failed (by either calculating a different
hash value than the one of the trusty URI, or by raising
an error that the respective file was not well-formed).
The only corrupted files that were successfully vali-
dated were 1,290 TriX files (0.83%) when running the
Java implementation and 181 TriX files (0.12%) when
running the Python implementation. Looking at these
concrete cases reveals that they are all harmless. In these
cases, the randomly changed byte was not part of the
RDF content, but of the meta-information. Due to minor
bugs in the used RDF libraries, this meta-information
is not sufficiently checked, which leads to accepting the
valid content instead of failing because of violated well-
formedness. All our TriX files start with the following
two lines:
<?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’UTF-8’?>
<TriX xmlns=’http://www.w3.org/2004/03/trix/tr
ix-1/’>
The RDF implementations in Java and Python (or the
respective system utilities to load XML files) do not
properly check these two lines containing meta-data.
Both libraries raise no error if a file starts with something
like <?Aml instead of <?xml (106 files); the Python
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TABLE 1
Performance and results of the different implementations for checking trusty URI nanopublications in normal mode
(top) and batch mode (bottom) on valid and corrupted files.
NORMAL MODE
method time in seconds result
impl. format mean stdev min max histogram valid invalid error
va
lid
fil
es
Java N-Quads 0.5229 0.0591 0.3750 5.5420
0 0.5 1 1.5
seconds per file
100% 0% 0%
Java TriG 0.5113 0.0569 0.3650 5.5340 100% 0% 0%
Java TriX 0.5383 0.0648 0.3900 5.5240 100% 0% 0%
Perl N-Quads 0.7843 0.1713 0.5990 5.7960 100% 0% 0%
Perl TriG 0.7901 0.1734 0.6030 5.7840 100% 0% 0%
Python N-Quads 0.1935 0.0164 0.1150 0.3050 100% 0% 0%
Python TriX 0.1912 0.0162 0.1190 0.3460 100% 0% 0%
co
rr
up
te
d
fil
es
Java N-Quads 0.5227 0.0591 0.3450 5.5420 0% 99.72% 0.28%
Java TriG 0.5003 0.0621 0.3200 5.4250 0% 83.37% 16.63%
Java TriX 0.5322 0.0655 0.3360 5.5230 0.83% 84.15% 15.03%
Perl N-Quads 0.7842 0.1712 0.6000 5.8880 0% 100% 0%
Perl TriG 0.7872 0.1727 0.5700 5.8230 0% 84.49% 15.51%
Python N-Quads 0.1934 0.0165 0.1200 0.3080 0% 100% 0%
Python TriX 0.1884 0.0176 0.1070 0.2760 0.12% 84.46% 15.42%
BATCH MODE
method time in seconds result
impl. format mean stdev min max histogram valid invalid error
va
lid
fil
es
Java N-Quads 0.0019 0.0062 0.0013 1.7202
0 0.01 0.02
seconds per file
100% 0% 0%
Java TriG 0.0009 0.0050 0.0008 1.7412 100% 0% 0%
Java TriX 0.0011 0.0050 0.0009 1.5656 100% 0% 0%
Perl N-Quads 0.0172 0.0006 0.0171 0.0679 100% 0% 0%
Perl TriG 0.0214 0.0016 0.0211 0.0872 100% 0% 0%
Python N-Quads 0.0070 0.0011 0.0065 0.0644 100% 0% 0%
Python TriX 0.0070 0.0009 0.0066 0.0578 100% 0% 0%
co
rr
up
te
d
fil
es
Java N-Quads 0.0012 0.0062 0.0006 1.6559 0% 99.72% 0.28%
Java TriG 0.0010 0.0049 0.0003 1.6335 0% 83.37% 16.63%
Java TriX 0.0011 0.0044 0.0005 1.3451 0.83% 84.15% 15.03%
Perl N-Quads 0.0171 0.0005 0.0169 0.0732 0% 100% 0%
Perl TriG 0.0195 0.0055 0.0007 0.0841 0% 84.49% 15.51%
Python N-Quads 0.0069 0.0011 0.0065 0.1716 0% 100% 0%
Python TriX 0.0063 0.0021 0.0006 0.1325 0.12% 84.46% 15.42%
library accepts invalid XML version numbers such as
1.a (73 files); and the Java library does not check
the TriX namespace argument, raising no error if the
argument name is changed to something like xmlnZ
(175 files) or the URI is wrong, such as .../Prix-1/
(1007 files). In addition, both libraries correctly accept the
rare cases (2 files) where the XML version was changed
from 1.0 to 1.1, which is the only other valid XML
version as of now, though much less common. All these
cases of corrupted files that are successfully verified are
harmless because the modified byte has no effect on the
internal representation of the RDF content once loaded
by the respective library. In a sense, the corrupted byte is
automatically corrected in these cases, leaving no trace
once the file is loaded.
6.2 Performance Tests on Nanopublications
Next, we used the same set of nanopublication files
to test the performance of the different modules for
checking trusty URI artifacts in different formats. There
are two scenarios of how to run such checks: One
can run one after the other, as when a small number
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of nanopublications are manually checked, or one can
execute such checks in the form of a batch job in a single
program run, which is the preferred procedure to run a
large number of checks without supervision. The time
required per file is typically much lower in batch mode,
as the runtime environment has to start and finalize only
once. Therefore it makes sense to have a look at both
scenarios.
Table 1 shows the results of these performance checks
for the normal mode (top) and batch mode (bottom).
These results and the ones presented below were ob-
tained on a Linux server (Debian) with 16 Intel Xeon
CPUs of 2.27GHz and 24GB of memory. As expected,
the time measurements are much lower in batch mode,
but checking is reasonably fast also in normal mode. All
average values are below 0.8s (0.03s for batch mode).
Using Java in batch mode even requires only 1ms per
file. Apart from the runtimes, the two modes had no
effect on the results.
6.3 Performance Tests on Bio2RDF
The tests above cover only very small RDF files, but
our approach should also work for larger files. For that
reason, we performed a second evaluation on Bio2RDF
(http://bio2rdf.org), which is an open-source project fo-
cused on the provision of linked data for the life sciences
[23], [24]. Bio2RDF scripts convert heterogeneously for-
matted data (e.g. flat files, tab-delimited files, dataset-
specific formats, SQL, and XML) into a common format
— RDF. Over 1 billion triples for 19 resources were made
available in the second coordinated release of Bio2RDF
[23], and mappings to the Semanticscience Integrated
Ontology [25] have been established. This second release
contains 874 RDF files in N-Triples format, but 16 of them
led in our study to well-formedness errors when loaded
with the current version of the Sesame library. (These
problems might be related to the transition to the new
RDF 1.1 standard, and they will be fixed for the next
release of Bio2RDF.) This leaves us for the presented
study with 858 files of sizes ranging from 1.4kB to 177GB.
Fig. 4 shows the results of these performance tests.
There is a lot of random variation on the lower end,
where files are smaller than 10MB and require less than
three seconds to be processed. For the upper part, time
values nicely follow near-linear trajectories (for the func-
tions that do not load the whole content into memory).
When hash calculation involves statement sorting, there
is a strict theoretical limit on its performance due to
the computational complexity of O(n log n). Transform-
LargeRdf and CheckLargeRdf are superior to their coun-
terparts only for very large files, and CheckSortedRdf is,
as expected, faster than the other checking procedures.
A large file of 2GB requires about five minutes to be
transformed and about two minutes to be checked. Files
larger than available memory take more time, but even
the largest file of the dataset of 177GB was successfully
transformed in 29 hours and checked in about three
hours.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a proposal for unambiguous URI
references to make digital artifacts on the (Semantic)
Web verifiable, immutable, and permanent. If adopted,
it could have a considerable impact on the structure and
functioning of the Web, could improve the efficiency
and reliability of tools using Web resources, and could
become an important technical pillar for the Semantic
Web, in particular for scientific data, where provenance
and verifiability are important. Scientific data analyses,
for example, might be conducted in the future in a fully
reproducible manner within “data projects” analogous to
today’s software projects. The dependencies in the form
of datasets could be automatically fetched from the Web,
similar to what Apache Maven (http://maven.apache.org)
does for software projects, but decentralized and verifi-
able.
As a next step into this direction, we have started
to develop a decentralized nanopublication server net-
work [26]. Nanopublications are distributed and repli-
cated among such servers and identified by trusty URIs,
thereby ensuring that these artifacts remain available
even if individual servers are terminated. The current
network consists of four servers in four different coun-
tries hosting 5 million nanopublications. In addition, we
are working on the concept of nanopublication indexes that
allow for the definition and identification of small or
large sets of nanopublications. Such indexes are nano-
publications themselves and, of course, are identified by
trusty URIs.
In general, the approach presented in this article might
contribute in a significant way to shape the future of
publishing on the Web.
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